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Abstract 
There are an increasing number of articles and publications that attempt to define resilience 
in the face of numerous drivers of risk. Most of this work has tried to identify the values and 
virtues that are encompassed within a resilient approach in relation to the fragile relationships 
between the social, natural and built environments (including, for instance, abilities to 
prevent, react, transform and adapt). However, much less attention has been paid to 
identifying the practical implications of these values and virtues once a paradigm of 
resilience has been adopted. In order to address this gap, this study examines what 
institutions in the UK have actually done when they attempt to enhance resilience. Instead of 
defining what resilience is, this paper focuses on what local and national governments and 
other stakeholders do when something is called (or is attempted to be made) ‘resilient’. The 
analysis of 30 key policy documents, a review of 20 formal meetings of a Local Resilient 
Forum, and 11 interviews with stakeholders confirm that different (and often competing) 
understandings of resilience coexist; but this work also reveal that two rather different 
approaches to resilience dominate in the UK. The first responds to security risks, based on a 
protectionist approach by the State, the other responds to natural risks, and prescribes the 
transfer of responsibilities from the State to other stakeholders. The analysis illustrates the 
extent to which resilience has become a highly complex, malleable and dynamic political 
construct with significant implications for the ways in which policy is enacted and enforced, 
often with unexpected consequences.  
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1. Introduction 
The concept of resilience captures the ability of a system to rebound or resume its original 
form after a stress or perturbation. In the 1970s resilience was associated with two distinct 
areas: the natural world and ecosystems, and the inner (psychological) world of individuals. 
A third application of the concept, associated with managing risks and threats appeared later, 
and is now closely linked to security and emergency planning as it incorporates the idea of 
‘robustness’ (Welsh, 2014).  
Due to its capacity to bridge both prevention (proactivity) and response (reactivity) to 
hazards, and its capacity to evoke the idea of ‘bouncing back’, the concept of resilience has 
become widely adopted in both policy instruments and academic research agendas. In 
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academic debates, most attention has been given to the definition (e.g. Johnson and 
Blackburn, 2014) and the development of models of resilience (Christoplos, 2014). In 
practice, governments and other institutions have adopted the term in policy documents and 
strategic plans aiming at enhancing resilience in the built environment and society. However, 
lack of commonly accepted definitions and models has inevitably led to tensions in decision-
making and intense debates in academic literature (Chmutina et al. 2014; Lizarralde et al., 
2015).  
Decision-makers and most scholars recognise that individuals, social groups, buildings and 
cities are – or have the potential to become – resilient. Nonetheless, it is known that the 
current notion of resilience frames a variety of ethical approaches in areas as diverse as 
ecology, architecture, urban planning, engineering, and human geography. Institutions and 
academics have thus devoted much energy and time to define the values and virtues that are 
to be honoured (and achieved) by adopting a resilient approach. Even though obvious 
differences exist between some of these approaches, most of them rhetorically assume that a 
resilient individual, agent or system has the ability to:  
- Anticipate an event and its effects;  
- Proactively react; 
- Manage risks; 
- Cooperate; 
- Respond after the event to mitigate effects; 
- Transform and or/adapt.  
But this list raises some questions: What are the consequences of identifying these attributes 
as existing or desirable? What attitudes and policies follow when stakeholders and 
institutions aim at developing (enhancing) these ideals? In his paramount publication “On the 
Genealogy of Morality” Friedrich Nietzsche argues that Western conceptions of moral ideals 
have been constructed upon the interests of religious or political elites – questioning classical 
conceptions of ethics that attached moral values to pure reasoning (Nietzsche et al., 1998). He 
thus questions the value of institutionalised virtues and ideals. Following this tradition of 
ethical scepticism, this paper examines the attitudes and practices that are motivated by a 
‘resilient’ approach, putting particular emphasis on what happens when institutions in general 
– and the State in particular - adopt the resilience paradigm in urban and national policy in 
the UK. The aim of this paper is not to introduce another definition, to argue the value of the 
existing ones, or to describe the characteristics of resilience, but instead to discuss a set of 
concerns that may act as a common denominator when it comes to trying to reify resilience. 
Such exploration will allow examining the multiple consequences of adopting different 
representations of resilience.  
2. Do we know what resilience is? 
Resilience has generally been defined in two ways: as a desired outcome, or as a process 
leading to a desired outcome (Kaplan, 1999). Bahadur et al. (2010) conducted a 
comprehensive literature review in order to demonstrate how resilience is conceptualised and 
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characterised, and concluded that while the term is widely used, its meaning is increasingly 
ambiguous. Funfgeld and Mcevoy (2012) argue that “resilience is not used in an exact, 
defined way, but more as a versatile (and seemingly fashionable) umbrella term, which 
loosely expresses some of the conceptual underpinning” (p. 326).  Joseph (2013) argues that 
“resilience does not really mean very much and whatever meaning it does have changes 
depending on the context” (p.47). Another tendency is understanding resilience in a binary 
way: it is seen as an all or nothing concept (Bourbeau, 2013), thus ignoring the scale of 
resilience.  
Shaw (2012) proposes that no matter what the definition is, resilience involves three 
elements: the ability to absorb the stress and retain functionality; the ability to “self-
organise”; and the capacity “to learn, to change and to adapt”. This suggests that the tensions 
are inherent in the construct of the ‘resilience’ concept. Yet, when discussing how to achieve 
resilience, it is important to consider the following (Vale 2014): 
- Resilience of what? 
- Resilience to what? 
- Resilience for whom? 
Whilst the definitions of resilience are multiple and often conflicting, what is clear is that the 
term resilience is increasingly used to signify a particular state of being, or set of processes to 
bring about a state of being. In other words, rather than recognising the malleable nature of 
the term, and the ways in which it is continually shaped by discourse (Alexander 2013), it is 
increasingly mobilised to represent and/or to justify a cause of action.  
2.1 Resilience and political approaches  
Striving for resilience is often seen as an agenda that fits perfectly into the neoliberal state 
(Chandler, 2014) that ‘venerates decentralisation, contextualisation, autonomy and 
independence’ (Handrup and Rosen, 2013, p.143). Evans and Reid (2014) see resilience as a 
neoliberal project and a doctrine that institutions in power use to manipulate - and eventually 
dominate – vulnerable sectors of society.  Whilst liberalism is about hands-on 
implementation, the approach of neoliberalism is more towards hands-off facilitation: in a 
neoliberal state relocation of authority – and simultaneously of responsibility - from the 
centre to the periphery takes place.   
Joseph (2013) points out that resilience under a neoliberal state stresses self-awareness, 
reflexivity and responsibility, and encourages the idea of ‘active citizenship’ (p. 42) where 
people do not rely on the State but instead take responsibility for their own well-being, which 
leads to preparedness and awareness. Chandler (2014) argues that resilience operates on the 
level of ‘unknown unknowns’, suggesting that the outcomes only reveal causality after the 
event and thus are impossible to know beforehand.  
Foucault (2007) emphasises that security is composed of a multiplicity of bits and pieces 
(techniques, machinery, practices, objects, people); and as these elements change, so does the 
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concept of security. Neoliberalism works through the social production of freedom (Foucault, 
2008), but although the State steps back and encourages individuals to act freely, it still 
intervenes into civil society by opening up new areas in which society can act (Joseph, 2013). 
As Sage et al. (2015) reveal, resilience policy and practice comprises a composite of 
circulatory mechanisms that scale political agency in relation to events. Overall, these 
perspectives point to the inevitable tensions between liberty and security that the resilience 
discourse reveals, thus highlighting the lack of policy neutrality (as the policy is forced to 
lean one way or the other).  
2.2 How is ‘resilience’ promoted in the UK? Overview of the resilience agenda  
Since 2001, there has been a dramatic change in the purpose and organisation of ‘civil 
protection’ in the UK: in place of the Cold War model of civil defence came a model with 
increased connections with society and full of interdependencies as a results of globalisation 
and impacts of new emerging threats (Mann, 2007). It was acknowledged that the Civil 
Defence approach was poorly suited to deal with the ‘complex emergencies’ and ‘new 
security challenges’ of the 21st century (Smith, 2003, p.414; Zebrowski, 2013), whereas the 
‘resilience agenda’ was seen as a proactive response to a ‘fast changing and complex world’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2010, p.10). A series of disruptive events in the early 2000s such as protests 
on the transport networks, the foot and mouth disease outbreak and severe flooding events 
also highlighted the need to restructure the existing security approach, which, when it came 
to the local level, mainly focused on emergency response rather than more proactive 
activities associated with reducing the underlying risks (Bosher, 2014).   
The resilience agenda goes hand in hand with the security agenda in the UK. Since 2000 a 
number of resilience policy documents have been mobilised due to security concerns, as well 
as security policy adopting the language of resilience. A good example of this is the UK 
government’s response to international terrorism and domestic radicalisation. It has generated 
a renewed interest in localism, with the aim of helping to build community resilience – and 
therefore address the radicalisation challenge (Coaffee and Fussey, 2015). However, whilst 
the security agenda has traditionally been highly centralised, the resilience agenda retreats 
from ‘grand planning’ and offers ‘a legitimate path for disengagement’ (Haldrup and Rosen, 
2013) by becoming a ‘facilitator’ instead of a ‘builder’ of strengths.  
Fjader (2014) points out that resilience contributes towards the security goal of the State, but 
at the same time resilience and security differ as security is ‘preventive and proactive in 
nature, aiming at protecting the State and the citizens against threat’, whereas resilience is ‘a 
combination of proactive and reactive measures aiming at reducing the impact but not 
preventing threats as such’ (p.9-10). This is further emphasised by Corry (2014) stating that 
the main difference between traditional security (e.g. Clarke, 1998) and resilience is that 
former focuses on a specific threat, whereas latter attempts to address uncertainties: ‘[it] 
makes little sense to “defend” against catastrophic climate change, pandemics, economic 
meltdowns, or even certain kinds of terrorism, insofar as security concerns such as these are 
based primarily on uncertainty, are located in the future, and often lack clear adversaries’ 
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(p.1). It is understood that the traditional security approach still has a role to play; but at the 
same time, there is a need to ‘take a broad view of the systems that we depend on’ ‘rather 
than following the ideological imprint of a bygone age’ (Evans and Steven, 2009). Resilience 
plays a clear role in addressing the risks emphasised in the National Risk Registers (with the 
most recent version published in 2015).1 Zebrowski (2013) argues that the resilience 
strategies of the UK government are now oriented ‘towards facilitating and optimising the 
natural, self-organisational capacities … of populations-in-emergency’ (p.160). It is also 
promoted as a response to highly capacious ‘disruptive challenges’ in the context of business 
continuity and organisations management (Aradau, 2014).  
Cabinet Office (2012) defines resilience as “the ability of the community, services, and of 
infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to withstand, handle and recover from 
disruptive challenges”. This concept frames many subsequent resilience-related initiatives, 
including the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) framework, the National Risk Register and 
National Security Strategy, cyber-security programmes, and plans for the protection of 
critical infrastructure and the prevention of violent extremism.  
The UK has an established system for emergency planning and engagement between required 
stakeholders (Figure 1) described in the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) (Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat, 2004). The CCA describes the duties of appropriate stakeholders to cooperate in 
LRFs (formal meetings and allocations of work to responsible stakeholders). The LRFs are 
based on police areas (HM Government, 2004) and provide a forum for the formal integration 
of a broad range of relevant stakeholders. It requires Category 1 ‘responders’ (local 
authorities, government agencies, emergency services and health services) and Category 2 
‘responders’ (utilities, transport, etc.) within a given locality to coordinate and prepare for the 
causes and consequences of various events. The coordination, however, is event-specific and 
the participation of Category 2 responders and other stakeholders depends on the nature of 
the event.  
LRFs typically meet three times a year to discuss emergency planning within their 
counties/municipalities. In the event of a major emergency, the LRF forms the Strategic 
Coordinating Group, a forum for the co-ordination of a multi-agency response. A number of 
sub-groups with specific areas of responsibility meet six times a year and report to the LRF. 
However LRFs are neither a legal entity nor do they have powers to direct their members. 
                                            
1 The 2015 National Risk register lists the following threats as being the most prominent: natural hazards 
(including human diseases; flooding; poor air quality events; volcanic hazards; severe space weather; severe 
weather; severe wildfires; animal diseases); major accidents (including major industrial accidents; widespread 
electricity failure; major transport accidents; disruptive industrial action; widespread public disorder); and 
terrorist and other malicious attacks (including terrorist attacks on crowded places; terrorist attacks on 
infrastructure;  terrorist attacks on transport systems; unconventional terrorist attacks; cyber security) (Cabinet 
Office, 2015) 
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 Figure 1 Emergency response arrangements in the UK2 (authors’ illustration)  
Overall, UK Civil Contingencies place less emphasis on catastrophe and more on a range of 
events that threatens to disrupt, damage, or destroy life due to the nature of the threats that the 
State faces and the result of the events described earlier.   
3. Methodology 
Whereas a number of disciplinary frames exists in which resilience can be applied (i.e. 
psychology, sociology, biology, ecology etc.), this paper focuses on policy and built 
environment literature, and notably on studies about how the built environment is designed, 
planned, built and managed. Here, we adopt a baseline definition of resilience provided by 
Bosher (2014): “[It] is a quality of a built environment’s capability (in physical, institutional, 
environmental, economic and social terms) to keep adapting to existing and emergent threats” 
(p. 241). Analysing the meaning of policy - and how this meaning is implemented - can be 
approached in a variety of ways: from narrative analysis (van Eetan, 2007) to cultural 
theories (Hoppe, 2007), to the use of grounded theory (Wagenaar, 2011). This paper reports 
the results of a study that has relied on an interpretive framework, which allows the 
researcher to “focus on meanings that shape actions and institutions, and the ways in which 
they do it” (p. 130) (Bevir and Rhodes, 2004), which was undertaken using the following 
steps.  
                                            
2 More information about the emergency response arrangements in the UK can be found in the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004; its summary is also provided in Fisher et al. 2014.  
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In the first step of the study - the literature review - was conducted. The second step 
contextualised the language and representations made in policy documents in the UK within 
expanded bodies of knowledge. UK national policy documents ranging from 2000 to 2014, 
published on the official government web site (www.gov.uk) and written by national 
agencies such as the Cabinet Office and the Home Office were examined. The web-portal 
was also searched under its ‘Policy’ and ‘Publications sections’. Over 400 results were 
identified, and then 30 policy documents, which are relevant to the built environment and in 
which the term resilience is explicitly stated, were contextually analysed (a detailed list is 
provided in Appendix A). In addition, 20 Local Resilient Forum (LRF) documents (including 
2005-20083 minutes of LRF meetings and their Constitution) were systematically analysed.  
The third step adopted an inductive approach to identify emergent viewpoints. The policies 
and LRF documents were examined for frequencies of word use and conceptual mapping 
based on the creation of word clouds using Nvivo software. This allowed for the 
identification of the most commonly used terms and underlying themes in each category of 
documents, and for comparison of frequencies of terms used and the general vocabulary 
adopted. It was noted that in the policy portal the term ‘resilience’ is mostly used under the 
following themes: emergency, infrastructure, climate change adaptation, disability, social 
care. 
However, a more nuanced reading of the way that resilience is adapted and adopted, 
particularly at a local level, was required. Therefore, in the fourth step, transcripts were 
analysed from 11 interviews that were conducted with local authorities and government 
agency stakeholders involved in the LRF; these stakeholders included: 
− Head of regeneration, city council 
− Flood management officer, city council 
− Three emergency planning officers, city council 
− Two liaison architectural officers, police 
− Fire and rescue service officer 
− Counter-terrorism security advisor 
− Civil contingencies research office, police 
− Representative of the Environment Agency. 
The semi-structured interviews were aimed at identifying the perceptions and representations 
of the resilience agenda among key local stakeholders. The interviewees were asked to define 
resilience and to comment on whether and how resilience is implemented in their day-to-day 
practice. All interviews lasted for approximately one hour; they were transcribed and 
annotated. An inductive approach was taken to their analysis, with initial higher level coding 
based on the key interview themes such as their roles, responsibilities, and actions. Further 
lower level coding was developed and refined as data analysis progressed; it included the 
analysis of specific responsibilities with regards to implementing resilience and examples of 
                                            
3 More recent minutes were not publically available. 
8 
 
the actions taken. Subsequently, thematic analysis allowed identification of a variety of 
approaches to resilience. Thematic analysis was chosen due to the complexity of the dataset 
and the need for a flexible analytical process to provide structure to the findings (Howitt and 
Cramer, 2011). In this way, key concepts were identified which had wider application, 
beyond the specific LRF under investigation, to the broader context of LRF stakeholder 
involvement in urban resilience. 
The final step of the study consisted of comparing word uses, frequencies of resilience-
related terminology and discourses of resilience among the national policy document, local 
level documents, and the transcripts of the interviews. This content analysis enabled patterns 
and analytical generalizations to be drawn among each group.  
4. Unpacking resilience 
4.1.1 Resilience representation in the UK policy  
As has already been discussed in Section 2.2, whilst the resilience agenda and the security 
agenda are often discussed together (e.g. Chandler, 2012; Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 
2006), the term ‘resilience’ only covers some particular areas. Table 1 provides the overview 
of the main areas of discussion and the main actors affected by resilience, which will be 
discussed in detail in this and the following sections.  
Table 1 Overview of selected resilience-related publications 
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CONTEST strategy (2011) X  X X  X X* X*  X X 
Strategic National Framework on 
Community Resilience (2011) 
X  X X X     X* *X 
The role of Local Resilience Forum 
(2011) 
X  X X    X*  X X 
Securing the future (2013) X  X  X   X*  X X 
Resilience in society: infrastructure, 
communities and businesses (2013) 
(X)5  X X  X  * X X  
National Risk Register (2015) X  X X X X  *    
Sector resilience plans (2014) X   X X X X*     
Strategic Defence and Security 
review (2010) 
X X X X   *     
                                            
4 As defined in Civil Contingencies Act 2004.  
5 In this policy document, resilience is only used in the title but not in the text.  
Submitted manuscript 
Accepted to Cities 
Resilient communications (2013) X   X  X  * X   
National Security Strategy (2010) X X  X   *   X  
Improving the UK’s ability to 
absorb, respond to and recover from 
emergencies (2013) 
  X      X* X* X* 
Flood and water management Act 
(2010) 
X   X  X  X*    
Keeping the country running (2011) X   X X  *     
The National adaptation programme 
(2013) 
X    X   * X   
Climate Resilient Infrastructure 
(2011) 
X    X    X*   
Climate Change Act (2008)     X  X* X*    
Civil Contingencies Act (2004)   X X   * *    
National Planning Policy Framework 
(2012) 
X    X   *    
* means that this stakeholder is responsible for addressing/acting on a threat/hazard  
As shown in Table 1, even though resilience is a significant part of the security agenda, there 
is a clear distinction between the issues addressed under the traditional security approach and 
the resilience approach. The traditional security discourse rarely uses the term ‘resilience’ 
(see second column in Table 1). The UK government continues to use a ‘nanny-state 
approach’ under which it believes it is the State’s duty to assume full responsibility for 
security challenges; and as a result, the population expects the government to address and 
solve security related matters. Resilience on the other hand is seen as a more ‘progressive’ 
approach, and is thus frequently used when it comes to new emerging security issues such as 
terrorism and cybercrime as well as shocks to infrastructure and emergencies associated with 
natural hazards, as well as other non-military threats (as demonstrated in columns 3 to 6 in 
Table 1). The example of the ways the term is used can be clearly seen in the latest Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (Cabinet Office, 2010). The main objects of the resilience 
agenda are businesses and communities, whereas the role of local and national governments 
is mainly to support resilience building. The UK resilience agenda demonstrates that the 
‘wicked issues’6 are the ‘unknown unknowns’ and thus require complex governance (simply 
‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ approaches are no longer enough) and involve more government 
intervention and coordination at both national and local level (this is clearly demonstrated by 
a range of actors involved (see ‘Intended audience’ columns of Table 1)). However, when the 
impact of a threat increases, it becomes more important to ‘securitise’ it and thus it may be 
dealt with using more traditional security approaches (see Figure 2).    
 
                                            
6 As stated by Andrew Lee’s CEO foreword in ‘Governing for the Future’ – “Increasingly, we face new types of 
problems – ‘wicked issues’ – which will require new types of response – flexible, adaptive, using systems 
thinking, seeing the whole picture not just a part of it. One of the watchwords will be creating ‘resilience’” 
(SDC, 2011,p.2) 
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Figure 2 An example of interchangeable approaches to governance within the ‘resilience’ agenda 
UK policy often uses resilience as an aspirational term (White and O’Hare, 2014): resilience 
is something local governments, businesses, communities, and individuals should be building 
and enhancing. In the circumstances where businesses and communities can do little to 
prevent risks, resilience becomes a comfort term that offers confidence that the situation will 
return back to ‘normality’7 and softens the vocabulary of security and emergency and to 
focus on more positive aspects of preparedness (Coaffee, 2013). At the same time, the use of 
the term appears to be leaning towards the economic and engineering interpretations of the 
concept; notably because it refers to physical protection, innovative design, networks, 
prosperity etc.  
The UK resilience agenda – and policies it is based upon – emphasises the idea of facilitating 
the implementation of resilience, rather than imposing it, acting as a neoliberal state (this is 
highlighted in Table 1, which demonstrates that local authorities are largely in charge of 
implementing resilience). By using resilience as a politically neutral policy objective (Raco 
and Street, 2012), the government actually masks political differences (that appear at various 
levels) over how it can be achieved and what the objectives of resilience are. This is 
demonstrated in practice, for instance, in the way that resilience agenda is implemented. Our 
empirical study finds that the government supports local activity, nevertheless it still dictates 
the forms in which these activities and particular tasks (e.g. risk assessments, business 
continuity measures, LRF, exercises, etc.) should be carried out by local bodies and 
                                            
7 This idea is challenged by Bach et al. 2010 when arguing that the Government relies on communities and local 
authorities to have a common understanding of what is ‘normal’, which is not necessarily the case. They provide 
an example of a complex, fragmented urban area divided along race, religion and socioeconomic status in 
Birmingham – what would be considered ‘normal’ in such case? 
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authorities, businesses and other relevant parties. Nonetheless, the Strategic National 
Framework on Community Resilience (Cabinet Office, 2011a) states that ‘the Government 
role is to support, empower and facilitate; ownership should always be retained by 
communities who have chosen to get involved in this work’ (p.14). In reality however, 
communities do not really have a choice about whether to get involved or not because they 
are required to act through local legislation. Whilst it is true that communities are charged 
with preparing for, and responding to, incidents, it is the State that decides the priorities of 
the resilience agenda and channels resources to them. This shows that the rhetoric of 
community level response masks, in reality, a centralised control, with only few 
governmental policies pointing out the role of the community in acting on a specific hazards/ 
threat (Table 1). In a situation like this, the government is seen as pushing a particular agenda 
and instead of giving the power back to society; it puts ‘local people ‘in the driving seat’ 
when in reality the direction of the journey has already been decided’ (Joseph, 2013, p. 48). 
Such an approach encourages the avoidance of responsibility and the ‘denial of choice’ when 
difficult decisions at the local level have to be made (Grint, 2009).  
As described earlier, the main responsibility for implementation falls on the local government 
and the LRFs; however, the analysis of policy documents indicates that the main subjects of 
these documents are the ‘community and the individual’. The fact that the UK Government 
does not provide a clear definition of the ‘community’ in the resilience-related context creates 
further difficulties in understanding who should be responsible for carrying out the task of 
increasing resilience. In many cases, communities are ‘encouraged to think’; the focus thus is 
not really on a community response but on individual responses. Furthermore, policy allows 
each individual to consider ‘who your community is and which community you belong to’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2011b, p.9).  
Table 1 also shows that resilience is prominently linked to emergency planning. Guidance to 
the CCA (the core guidance for local authorities and the backbone of the resilience agenda in 
the UK) states that, for the purposes of identifying an emergency, resilience is concerned 
with the consequences of an event, rather than the causes (Cabinet Office, 2005). This leads 
to a surprising finding: the CCA encourages local authorities to focus on the contingencies – 
i.e. be prepared – whereas the policy aimed at communities and individuals encourage them 
be proactive and preventive.   
4.2 How resilience is implemented locally 
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the main mechanisms for implementing resilience are the LRFs. 
The interviews with the LRF members reveal that their understanding of resilience – 
unsurprisingly - goes in line with the CCA and clearly focuses on emergency response 
activities. However, the implementation of resilience at a local level is hindered by a number 
of challenges. The interviewees pointed out that LRFs have no budget for their activities, and 
thus, the associated costs are met by the relevant agency or sector involved (e.g. police); 
consequently the recent budget cuts means that financing LRF projects becomes much more 
problematic. Although resilience-related activities are not perceived to be extremely 
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resource-expensive, all respondents expressed concerns about the current economic situation, 
and in particular, the impact of the UK Government’s recent spending cutbacks to public 
services such as emergency planning. Another issue is high level strategic ‘buy-in’: it is 
extremely difficult to get senior management to engage with the LRF process, as those in 
senior positions prioritise issues as they see fit, rather than according to those defined by the 
LRF. Fisher et al. (2014) point out that the main reason for these challenges is the fact that 
LRFs are not a legal entity.  
Our analysis of the minutes from 2005 to 2010 of one of the UK’s LRFs and its Constitution 
provides a useful insight into the focus of LRF discussions and actions. There is a large 
emphasis on planning and emergency, as one might expect. The City Council (as a member 
of the LRF) is mentioned more frequently than any other LRF member (343 times compared 
to police, which was mentioned 112 times and the fire and rescue service, which was 
mentioned 150 times). ‘Information’ is mentioned a large number of times (252), in the 
context of both receiving and providing it. The community however is not discussed often: it 
only gets 93 mentions, mainly in the context of community resilience groups.  
This analysis shows that not all the themes of resilience outlined by the government are 
acknowledged in the LRF documents. For example, climate change adaptation is not really 
touched upon, but as Shaw and Maythorne (2011) argue, LRFs (and emergency managers) 
have nothing to do with climate change (i.e. as a potential cause of a disaster); this issue is 
dealt by special climate change officers based within more local authorities. Again, this 
reemphasises the point stated in the CCA guidance that resilience deals with the effects and 
not the causes.  
As discussed earlier, local authorities and agencies are not the only ones responsible for 
increasing resilience at a local level: the government gives the responsibility to implement 
resilience to local governments, yet in its policies it focuses on the individuals. As stated in 
the Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience (Cabinet Office, 2011a, p.3), 
‘There will be times when individuals and communities are affected by an emergency but are 
not in immediate danger and will have to look after themselves and each other for a period 
until any necessary external assistance can be provided. Communities will also need to work 
together, and with service providers, to determine how they recover from an emergency’.  
This role is a part of the renewed invocation of localism and community through the 
government’s ‘Big Society’ programme, which has been introduced simultaneously with 
reductions on public expenditure and service provision (MacKinnon and Driscoll Derickson, 
2012). This programme encourages communities and governments ‘to work together’ (Bach 
et al. 2010) but in reality such togetherness does not exist as there is not sufficient dialogue; 
instead there is a one-way information flow from the government to the local authorities 
(Figure 3). Local authorities are charged with the role of an information and guidance 
provider in the context of resilience, with formal relationships between local authorities and 
LRF, communities and national government. This isn’t an easy task however as the 
relationship between local governments and communities may not be straightforward, as very 
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often local authorities suffering from the lack of capacity and capability are unable to arrange 
the required level of outreach (Bach et al. 2010).  
 
Figure 3 Graphical representation of the resilience-related information exchange between 
national and local actors 
The Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience (2011) states that ‘Individual 
resilience is about having an informed understanding of the risks faced and the likely impact 
of those risks…. [Individuals] need to be able to assess their proximity or vulnerability to 
these risks and use this as motivation to act and be prepared’ (p.11). This underlines that 
resilience can be built when the individuals – and the communities – are well informed. But 
in reality resilience building has to take place without any prescriptive advice from the 
national government. One of the government documents states that: ‘Householders and 
businesses at flood risk should take the appropriate steps to better protect their properties 
through property level resistance and resilient measures’ (HMG, 2011, p.26, authors’ 
emphasis); it is however unclear what resilient measures should be used and who would 
finance such improvements. Instead the policy document simply urges individuals to create 
their own resilient strategies, while at the same time the government is doing little to force 
property developers to design in resistance/resilience measures when they knowingly build in 
flood prone areas. 
Contrary to the national documents, the LRF defines community as ‘a group of interacting 
people living in a common location’, and also ‘communities’ sharing a common interest or 
experience such as ethnic or religious groups, or groups of people affected by an 
emergency’.8 In addition, there is a list of actions for community engagement, however this 
                                            
8 This publication has not been listed in a reference list in order to protect the anonymity of the LRF, as both its 
authorship and title contain the name of the constituency in which this particular LRF operates. 
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list is again rather one-sided. It clearly states how the LRF should engage with the 
community, and which responder is responsible for the engagement (e.g. in the case of the 
analysed LRF it is police), but there is no acknowledgement of the dialogue that is required.  
It is pointed out that local authorities should provide resilience-related advice on their 
websites, however the study conducted by Herbane (2011) argues that the provided advice is 
not sufficient. The guidance to the CCA requires responders to publish their assessments and 
plans on the local authority websites in order to communicate their CCA-related 
responsibilities and provide advice and assistance beneficial to public in the prevention or 
response to an emergency (Cabinet Office, 2005). However as identified by Herbane (2011), 
the content of the websites has a publicity rather than advisory focus: the majority of the local 
authorities’ websites mainly report on dealing with flooding and diseases/epidemics but 
hardly have any references to other matters, for instance, terrorism and cybercrime. In 
addition, only 3% of all the local authorities’ websites have a reference to the general public 
as a stakeholder. 
The interviewees also pointed out that communicating with the public is one of the biggest 
problems they face. The LRF discussed in this paper has made concerted efforts towards 
effective information sharing with the public, using various methods of communication such 
as Twitter, which allows the emergency services to more easily ascertain where problems 
might arise, and to respond to public concerns. Further interventions that would increase 
resilience require legislation, in order to, for example, allow mobile phone broadcasts to be 
made. However these actions are not necessarily effective. The interviewees mention that this 
can be attributed to a lack of awareness among the general population and agree that there is 
a need to increase education at school level in order to increase overall resilience. The 
interviewees feel that in the UK the general public has a passive attitude and can demonstrate 
signs of ‘dependency’ when it comes to experiencing a natural hazard related emergency.  
5. Discussion 
The ‘resilience agenda’ in the UK introduced a number of neoliberal policies that were seen 
as a way to move away from state-enforced security to ‘the side of laissez-faire’ approach 
(Amin, 2013, p.141). The ‘command and control’ approach was based on the idea that the 
public entrusts their safety into the hands of an authority, whereas today’s resilience agenda 
is based on a large amount of information, advice, expert opinion as well as ‘heroism’ stories 
where an individual acts in an emergency (Amin, 2013). This evolution of resilience 
transitioning from governmental concept to public responsibility is presented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Evolution of resilience building responsibilities in the UK (partially adapted from 
Coaffee and Fussey, 2015) 
Although government policies promote a broader idea of resilience (as demonstrated in the 
definition), once the implementation of resilience reaches local level, its focus shifts to 
emergency and immediate response. Such a discrepancy between government policy and 
local action has been demonstrated in the previous sections. Another example of such 
discrepancy is related to the threats and hazards that should be addressed under the resilience 
agenda. As highlighted in the sections above, the UK national resilience agenda covers a 
wide-range of hazards and threats, but also touches upon trends such as climate change. 
When discussed under the resilience umbrella, only one part of the climate change agenda – 
climate change adaption – is addressed, leaving climate change mitigation a responsibility of 
somebody else. The connection is clear (climate change is linked to natural hazards), and 
therefore climate change is being securitised at the national level. However at a local level 
such an approach makes the implementation of resilience even harder, as it is not clear what 
it is exactly that institutions need to implement: do they need to address the causes or the 
effects, i.e. is the priority to adapt to or mitigate the effects of climate change taking into 
account the budget cuts. 
The implementation of the resilience agenda at a local level is an exercise in coordination that 
ensures oversight, cooperation and leadership. At the same time, it is not fully devolved to 
local authorities and is kept close to the national government, thus intending for the State to 
step in when expected. Many of the policies introduce interventions for both national and 
local levels simultaneously giving powers to, for example, the Secretary of State, but at the 
same time emphasising the importance of local authorities - while also cutting sources of 
funding. Shaw (2012) suggests that a resilient local authority should be innovative, able to 
manage risks, have strategic leadership and enhance the involvement of civil society, but to 
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do so they would require funding, which (as pointed out earlier) is an issue. For instance, the 
emergency management department in the case study county received 12% less funding in 
the 2013/2014 fiscal year than in the previous year.   
The resilience approach emphasises the desirability of personal contingency plans and 
importance of public involvement and at the same time makes an emergency a ‘shared 
problem’. However the results of  ‘sharing the problem’ could effectively be encouraging 
people to think it is a problem to be solved by someone else (and as a result people do not do 
anything), particularly when the information provided is not targeted at the general public but 
instead is given to the local authorities. Since local authorities cannot – and should not – 
build resilience on their own, communities and individuals are encouraged to be prepared for 
emergencies – but again the State plays its role: as resilience can only be increased by 
‘communities and individuals harnessing local resources and expertise to help themselves in 
an emergency, in a way that complements the response of the emergency services’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2011c, p.4, authors’ emphasis).  
However such an approach may not be very effective as the population knows that the State 
will respond – and take the situation under control - should the impact of an event increase 
dramatically and beyond the local level. A good example of this is that many of the UK 
residents (despite the large amount of easily accessible information and advice) continue to 
invest in home ownership in flood prone areas while at the same time not necessarily 
investing into measures to protect their houses against flooding (Bosher 2014). In addition, 
whilst policies implemented under the ‘resilience agenda’ have characteristics of 
neoliberalism, a critical stakeholder - i.e. the public – is not significantly involved in the 
decision-making process (as has been demonstrated in the UK definition of resilience). 
Although the government expects the community to use and ‘adapt their everyday skills and 
use them in extraordinary circumstances’ (Cabinet Office, 2011a, p.15), all the emergency 
efforts are led by the local authorities, who only occasionally involve private organisations 
and rarely devolve responsibility to communities and citizens.    
The policies on resilience also create a sense that the government has chosen the threats and 
hazards the population can deal with and can be trusted with addressing (Figure 5), but – 
again – only under the supervision of the State.    
Submitted manuscript 
Accepted to Cities 
 
 Figure 5 Schematic representation of resilience-making in the UK 
Theoretically, under the current resilience agenda, the communities are provided with an 
opportunity to become more resilient and to establish renewed relationships with the State 
based on trust. However in reality local community efforts (e.g. neighbourhood watch, parish 
councils) take place because communities perceive local emergency plans to fail due to their 
over-reliance on central government (whom communities do not trust) (Bach et al., 2010; 
Sage et al., 2015). But overall, promoted in a time of austerity measures and without any 
guidance, such initiatives will affect disadvantaged communities that already lack skills and 
resources and thus may not be able to adapt (to cope with the hazardous circumstances and 
therefore ‘build resilience’.  
6 Conclusions 
Although resilience has been widely discussed in the academic literature in the UK and 
internationally, the majority of the literature focuses on defining resilience and analysing the 
impacts of the resilience policy.  The aim of this paper however differs: it has discussed what 
national and local governments and other stakeholders have done when attempting to make 
someone or something ‘resilient’. The results of this paper have a number of practical and 
theoretical implications:  
• An improved appreciation of the limits and uses of resilience theories; 
• Identification of possible political consequences of adopting the resilience approach; 
• Comprehension of the role of the State and institutions within the resilience agenda; 
and 
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• Identification of hierarchies emerging due to the localisation of resilience. 
A variety of emergent local and global threats to UK security has created an opportunity for 
the emergence of the resilience agenda, where the government articulates the costs and 
benefits of risk prevention, and the community and local governments act upon it (in a top-
down cascade of responsibilities). Whilst masked as not being such, resilience is a politically 
charged term used as a tool in the government’s attempts to keep centralised control and at 
the same time create a mirage of neoliberalism by shifting responsibilities from the State 
towards local authorities, communities and businesses. The handling of resilience within a 
neoliberal context has been seen as a tool to demonstrate ‘good governance’ of the UK 
government and to promote local empowerment. However, this only happens in policy 
rhetoric and is not reflected in practice. The political rhetoric moved from security and 
emergency as these terms implied government responsibility, to resilience which is hoped to 
imply individual responsibility. 
Looking at national policies and local implementation documents, there is a sense of 
disconnect between the goals for achieving community resilience and for implementing 
resilience: local community resilience is about mobilisation, whereas local authorities 
resilience overall is about preparedness and response. National policy documents adopt a 
vague but pre-emptive definition of resilience, which – when have to be implemented at a 
local level - is still articulated through the lens of emergency planning: the focus is still on 
what to do in case of an event and how to prepare for it. This issue has been highlighted in 
previous studies and is clearly articulated by a local Emergency Planning Officer “We plan 
for the contingency of the actual event and then we are there to respond thereafter if 
something happens, but we don’t at this moment in time (...) get prepared to make ourselves 
more resilient prior to it. [It’s] what would happen if something happened now rather than 
trying to make it safer immediately, if that makes sense? Our team is very much more a 
response after the event and planning towards such events” (quoted in Chmutina et al. 
2014:5). 
There should be a more prominent difference between addressing the events (short-term) and 
trends (long-term). A shift in the resilience discourse in the UK’s policy is needed as it is 
currently dominated by the protection of physical assets, thus focusing on more 
straightforward short-term challenges, which are easier to address as they are more visible. 
Instead the resilience policy in the UK should focus on longer-term challenges that can be 
lessened by introducing and effectively implementing more preparedness and prevention 
strategies.  
The resistance to such a shift may be due to the capacities and capabilities of local 
authorities. Resilience policies are often couched as ‘one size fits all’ with the importance of 
local authorities - and their decisions and capabilities - typically under-represented. In 
addition, emergency managers who are in charge of building and implementing resilience 
plan to respond (rather than be more preventive) to the vents because that is the way they 
have been trained to operate, thus making preparedness and recovery a predominant feature. 
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Rhetorically, resilience certainly offers communities and individuals increased – but within 
the boundaries - empowerment, however the implementation of resilience has a large gap: a 
gap in communication of technical and expert knowledge on how resilience can be increased. 
In order for the individuals and communities to play a real role in increasing resilience, they 
have to become effective agents in the decision-making process. Currently the national and 
local government talk to each other and amongst themselves but do not really engage with the 
community based individuals who are expected to facilitate resilience measures; 
consequently they do not share sufficient information for community members/groups to 
make more informed decisions.   
The interpretation of resilience has moved from a term to a way of thinking, a paradigm that 
collects a number of concepts rather than a concept itself. As a result, resilience has become 
an idea with many different intentions and with a very wide extension. It includes a range of 
components, from international aid and leadership to resistance and security, to sustainability 
and community well-being. This makes it impossible to decide whether a specific state is 
resilient or not, and to find out how a resilient state can be achieved. However, it also has its 
advantages: due to its vagueness, resilience now plays a role of a term that facilitates 
communication across various disciplines and it often creates a perception of a shared 
vocabulary. It could be argued that such vagueness makes this term politically successful and 
useful in helping – to a certain extent – to reconcile the interests of politicians and 
practitioners. But at the same time – and as demonstrated here - the vagueness and 
malleability of the term ‘resilience’ has led to a variety of interpretations and applications, 
and is indeed understood differently by different stakeholders at different levels.  
The UK approach, whilst endorsing a shift towards increasing resilience and encouraging the 
implementation of resilience as a process rather than a command and control exercise, still 
remains highly centralised and dominated by prescriptive policies. Present approaches to 
resilience rely upon implementation by those in charge while excluding those directly 
affected. Making resilience-related policies more flexible and allowing for the incorporation 
of prevention measures could provide an opportunity to develop local frameworks that 
respond to local needs without being constrained within rather outdated institutional 
frameworks. As a political construct, resilience policy leads to losers and winners. It is 
important to identify them and make sure that it is not the most vulnerable individuals or 
social groups who carry the burden of resilience policy.  
 
References 
Alexander, D. E. 2013. Resilience and disaster risk reduction: An etymological journey. 
Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 1, 1257–1284. 
Amin, A., 2013. Surviving the turbulent future. Environment and planning D: Society and 
space. 31, 140-56.  
20 
 
Aradau, C., 2014. The promise of security: resilience, surprise and epistemic politics. 
Resilience, xx, xx-xx. 
Bach, R., Doran, R., Gibb, L., Laufman, D. and Settle, K., 2010.  Policy challenges in 
supporting community resilience. Working paper. London workshop of the multinational 
community resilience policy group. November 2-5. 2010.  
Bahadur, A.V., Ibrahim, M and Tanner, T., 2010. The resilience renaissance? Unpacking of 
resilience for tackling climate change and disasters. Report for Strengthening climate 
resilience. Available at: http://community.eldis.org/.59e0d267/resilience-renaissance.pdf. 
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. A. W., 2004. Interpreting British governance. British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 6, 130-136. 
Bosher L.S., 2014. Built-in resilience’ through Disaster Risk Reduction: Operational issues. 
Building Research & Information. 42 (2), 240-254. 
Bourbeau, P., 2013. Resiliencism: premises and promises in securitisation research. 
Resilience, 1(1), 3-17.  
Cabinet Office, 2005. Emergency Preparedness: Guidance on Part I of the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004, its associated regulations and non-statutory arrangements. The 
Stationary Office, London. 
Cabinet Office, 2008. The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an 
interdependent world. The Stationary Office, London.  
Cabinet Office, 2010. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: the Strategic Defence and 
Security Review. The Stationary Office, London.  
Cabinet Office, 2011a. Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience.  The 
Stationary Office, London.  
Cabinet Office, 2011b. Preparing for Emergencies: Guide for communities. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60923/PFE-
Guide-for-Communities_0.pdf 
Cabinet Office, 2011c. Keeping the country running: natural hazards and infrastructure. The 
Stationary Office, London.  
Cabinet Office, 2012. Glossary: revision to emergency preparedness. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61046/EP_Glo
ssary_amends_18042012_0.pdf  
Cabinet Office, 2015. National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies 2015 edition. The 
Stationary Office, London.  
Submitted manuscript 
Accepted to Cities 
Chandler, D. 2012. Resilience and human security: The post-interventionist paradigm. 
Security Dialogue, 43( 3),  213-229. 
Chandler, D. 2014. Beyond neoliberalism: resilience, the new are of governing complexity. 
Resilience, 2 (1), 47-63.  
Christoplos, I., 2014. Resilience, rights and results in Swedish development cooperation. 
Resilience, xx, xx-xx  
Chmutina, K., Lizarralde, G., Dainty, A. and Bosher, L., 2014. The Multiple Representations 
of Resilience: Tensions in Practice and Theoretical Debates. In: Schrentk, M., Popovich, 
V.V., Zeile, P. and Elisei P. (eds.), Proceeding of RealCorp 2014 Conference, Vienna, 
Austria, 21-23 May. 
Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 2004. Civil Contingencies Act 2004: A Short Guide. 
London, Cabinet Office  
Clarke, M. 1998. British Security Policy. In: Eliassen, K.A. (ed.), Foreign and Security 
Policy in the European Union. Sage Publications, UK.  
Coaffee, J., 2013. Rescaling and responsibilising the politics of urban resilience: from 
national security to local place-making. Politics, 33(4), 240-52.  
Coaffee, J. and Fussey, P. 2015. Constructing resilience through security and surveillance: 
the politics, practices and tensions of security-driven resilience. Security Dialogue, 46 (1), 
86-105.  
Coaffee, J. and Murakami Wood, D. (2006). Security is Coming Home: Rethinking Scale and 
Constructing Resilience in the Global Urban Response to Terrorist Risk. International 
Relations, 20 (4), 503-517. 
Corry, O. (2014). From Defense to Resilience: Environmental Security beyond Neo­
liberalism. International Political Sociology, 8(3), 256-274. 
Evans, A. and Steven, D. 2009.  Risks and resilience in the new global era. Renewal : a 
Journal of Labour Politics. 17(1) , 44-52. 
Evans, B., & Reid, J. (2014). Resilient life: The art of living dangerously. Malden, MA: 
Polity Press. 
Fisher, J., Chmutina, K. and Bosher, L. 2014.  Urban resilience and sustainability: the role of 
a local resilience forum in England. In: Masys, A.J. (ed.), Disaster Management - Enabling 
Resilience, Springer, USA; pp. 91-107 
Fjader, C., 2014. The nation-state, national security and resilience in the age of globalisation. 
Resilience: International policies, practices and discourse. 2 (2), 114-29.  
22 
 
Foucault, M., 2007. Security, territory, population: lectures at the College de France, 1977-
78. Palgrave: Basingstoke.  
Foucault, M., 2008. Birth of Biopolitics. Palgrave: Basingstoke.  
Funfgeld, H. and McEvoy, D, 2012. Resilience as a useful concept for climate change 
adaptation? Planning theory and practice, vol.13 (2), pp. 324-28.  
Grint, K., 2009. Leadership and resilience research report.  
Haldrup, S.V. and  Rosen, F., 2013. Developing resilience: a retreat from grand planning. 
Resilience, 1 (2), 130-145.  
Herbane, B., 2011. Communications about resilience enhancing activities by English local 
authorities. Public Management Review. 13 (7), 919-39.  
Howitt, D. and Cramer, D., 2011. Introduction to Research Methods. Prentice Hall, UK. 
HM Government, 2004.  Emergency Preparedness. London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office  
HM Government, 2011. Understanding the risks, empowering communities, building 
resilience: the national flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for England. 
Unnumbered Act Paper, 23 May 2011.  
Hoppe, R. 2006.  Applied cultural theory tool for policy analysis. In: Fischer, F., Miller, G.J., 
and Sidney, M.S. (eds.), Handbook of Public Policy Analysis Theory, Politics, and Methods. 
CRC Press.  
Johnson, C. and Blackburn, S. 2014. Advocacy for urban resilience: UNISDR’s Making 
Cities Resilience campaign. Environment and Urbanism, 26 (1), 29-52.  
Joseph, J., 2013. Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: a governmentability approach. 
Resilience, 1 (1), 38-52.  
Kaplan, H.B.,1999. Towards an understanding of resilience: a critical review of definitions 
and models. In: M.D. Glantz and J.L. Johnson (eds.) Resilience and Development. Kluwer 
Academic, New York, USA, pp. 17-83.  
Lizarralde, G., Chmutina, K., Dainty, A. and Bosher, L.  (2015). Sustainability and resilience 
in the built environment: The challenges of establishing a turquoise agenda in the UK. 
Sustainable Cities and Society. (15), 96-104. 
MacKinnon, D. and Driscoll Derickson, K., 2012. From resilience to resourcefulness: a 
critique of resilience policy and activism. Progress in Human Geography, 37(2), 253-70.  
Mann, B. 2007. Protecting the UK’s critical infrastructure. Contingency Today. London: 
Cabinet Office. 
Submitted manuscript 
Accepted to Cities 
Nietzsche, F., Clark, M., & Swensen, A. J. (1998). On the genealogy of morality: Hackett 
Publishing. 
Raco, M. and Street, E., 2012.  Resilience planning, economic change and the politicas of 
post-recession development in London and Hong Kong. Urban Studies. 49 (5), 1065-87.  
Sage, D., Fussey, P. and Dainty, A. 2015. Securing and scaling resilient futures: 
neoliberalization, infrastructure, and topologies of power. Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space. 33, 495-511.  
Shaw, K., 2012. The rise of the resilient local authority? Local government studies, 38 (3), 
281-300.  
Shaw, K. and Maythorne, L., 2011. Managing resilience: towards a strategic approach. Public 
Policy and Administration. 28 (1), 43-65.  
Smith, J., 2003. Civil Contingencies planning in Government. Parliamentary Affaris.56, 
4410-22.  
Sustainable Development Commission, 2011. Governing for the future: The opportunities for 
mainstreaming sustainable development. Available at: http://www.sd-
commission.org.uk/data/files/publications/SDC_SD_Guide_2011_2.pdf  
Vale, L. J., 2014. The politics of resilient cities: whose resilience and whose city?. Building 
Research & Information, 42(2), 191-201. 
Wagenaar, H., 2011. Meaning in Action: Interpretation and Dialogue in Policy Analysis. 
Routledge.  
Welsh, M., 2014. Resilience and responsibility : governing uncertainly in a complex world. 
The Geographical Journal, 180 (1), 15-26.  
White, I. and O’Hare, P. (2014). From rhetoric to reality: which resilience, why resilience, 
and whose resilience in spatial planning? Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy, 32 (5), 934-50.   
Zebrowski, C., 2013. The nature of resilience. Resilience. 1 (3), 159-173.  
 
Appendix A: List of analysed policy documents  
1. Terrorism Act (2000) 
2. Civil Contingencies Act (2004) 
3. Improving the flood performance on new buildings (2007) 
4. Climate Change Act (2008) 
5. A stronger Britain in an age of uncertainties: the National security Strategy (2010) 
6. Strategic Defense and Security review (2010) 
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7. Strategy for national infrastructure (2010) 
8. Flood and water management Act (2010) 
9. Strategic framework and policy statement on improving the resilience of critical 
infrastructure to disruption from natural hazards (2010) 
10. Keeping the country running: natural hazards and infrastructure (2011) 
11. CONTEST strategy (2011) 
12. Climate Resilient Infrastructure (2011) 
13. Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience (2011) 
14. The role of Local Resilience Forum (2011) 
15. Localism Act (2011) 
16. A summary of 2012 sector resilience plans (2012) 
17. National Planning Policy Framework (2012) 
18. Adapting to climate change (2013) 
19. Improving the UK's ability to absorb, respond to and recover from emergencies 
(2013) 
20. National risk register of civil emergencies (2013) 
21. Securing the future (2013) 
22. Resilience in society: infrastructure, communities and businesses (2013) 
23. Resilient communications (2013) 
24. The National adaptation programme (2013) 
25. Protecting the UK against terrorism (2013) 
26. The role of Local Resilience Forums (2013) 
27. Maintaining UK energy security (2013) 
28. Providing regulation and licensing of energy industries and infrastructure (2013)  
29. Sector resilience plans (2014) 
30. National Risk Register (2015) 
 
 
